I rarely stray into the geo-political, but here goes. The arrest of a supposed Saudi intelligence officer allegedly leading an insurgent group in Syria demonstrates again that the Syrian unrest is quite a bit more complex than some of the other Arab Spring revolutions. There is an underlying current of Shia-Sunni conflict within Syria and suggestions of the revolutions being encouraged by the Saudis and others. Much more than the North African leaderless revolutions, the Syrian situation has real global implications, with knock on effects possible in all its surrounding countries.
A number of factors bear examination:
Qatar. I’m intrigued once again by the bullish role of Qatar. After contributing significantly, both politically and militarily in Libya, Qatar has been the most vocal of Arab League members for action against Assad’s regime. We can believe that their motivation is to see democracy in Syria, or we can believe that they prefer a Sunni controlled country. Take your pick.
Turkey. There’s significant Turkish interest in supporting the Free Syria Army from Erdogan’s Turkey, and their motivation is I believe anti Iran and therefore anti Shia. After years of trying to get a toe hold in European politics, Erdogan has faced his country’s efforts in the other direction.
Iraq. Iraq’s own Sunni- shia conflict is bubbling away as al-Maliki gets nervous. If Syria “turned Sunni” then Iraq’s Sunnis would be given a model and support, potentially.
Iran – It’s is clear that Iran is not standing idly by and is supporting Assad. I don’t know this to be true but I bet IRGC are in there and mixing it up. I’m intrigued at some of the special skills of IRGC that might be deployed in Syria. For example IRGC are “all over” and controlling, understanding and exploiting social media in Iran – but I’m not sure that social media is as big in Damascus as it is in Tehran. But if Iran became isolated as the only Shia state in the Muslim world, and if it suffers economic sanctions that really begin to bite, who knows how secure the regime will be. Coming elections may give us a hint.
Lebanon. Clearly Hezbollah, as Shias, will support Assad, but the rest of Lebanon will be taking close interest. For the past few decades the unspoken might of the Syrian military on its back door has been a significant influence on Lebanese politics, and not just because of Hezbollah’s affiliation.
Saudi. The Saudis will of course deny the arrest of the alleged Saudi agent. But no prizes for understanding their own political aspirations in the region at a time when their deadliest enemy, Iran, is rattling its sabre across the Gulf. They may feel that Sunni control of Syria will enable a stronger isolation of Iran within the Islamic world. And that perspective they will share with Israel and the US, desperate to nullify the nuclear threat.
Palestinians. Hamas’s feed of political strength and resources from Damascus is the point to the Palestinian view. Will Hamas need to find another patron, and if so, where will they turn? – Egypt’s now electorally strong Muslim Brotherhood has got to be favourite, but I wouldn’t rule out Turkey where Erdogan’s policies has turned off what was once quite a pro-Israel strategy.
Israel. For the last 50 years Israel has had a policy of embracing chaos, because within a chaotic set of enemies their own single minded focus won through. But if I were Israel I’d be pretty worried by the dynamic evolutions and revolutions occurring around them. The only thing they’ll feel happy about is a potential drop in resources for Hezbollah, and the fact that Hezbollah may turn to face East a little more, rather than south if Syria went Sunni.
The West. No appetite for involvement, but getting panicky. Politically Europe can’t and won’t get too involved, the US has no interest in another middle eastern adventure, but there are real worries that the Chinese and Russian stances are seen as unhelpful in the extreme. If US troops were still in Iraq, then that would be a card to play, but they ain’t there no more. So the US policy is left to Mrs Clinton to pontificate about, and nothing else, unless you count quiet encouragement of Turkish, Qatari and Saudi efforts. It’s pretty startling really to see the US (or US proxies) encouraging Sunni extremists in revolution! Be careful what you sow (again).
Finally Syria itself. The downtrodden masses of Syria have been living under an Assad dictatorship for quite a while now and have their own view. In truth I now think that those fighting proxy wars in Syria have more say in the outcome than the people of Syria. The Assad regime has got a long way to go yet and are clearly willing to fight it out. This is going to a long road I predict, and unlike the other Arab Spring revolutions, this could spin on for years.
I could go on – there are knock-on effects elsewhere including Afghanistan.
It’s half Rubiks Cube, half Jenga.
Pedantry: It doesn’t logically follow that Turkey is anti-Iranian “and therefore anti Shia”. I don’t deny that the Shia / Sunni split is fundamental to the larger dynamic, but Iran and the Shia are not synonymous. I’d happily live next door to most Shia – I’d just choose not to live next door to the Iran, if you see what I mean.
Question: Why is it clear that ‘Hezbollah, as Shia, will support Assad?’ Although the Alawites might consider themselves to be Shia, it seems to me that they’re not, they’re about close to the Shia as they are to the C of E. Although it might be inconvenient for Hezbollah / Iran to lose an ally, I don’t think there there’s a genuine religious fraternity there. It’s opportunism – and it may not be opportune for much longer. The Alawites account for less than 10% of the population of Syria, and not all Alawites are loyal to the regime. Given the high level of cooperation between Hezbollah and Hamas (proving that the schism can be bridged, if necessary), doesn’t there come a point when Hezbollah / Iran settles for cordial relations with a Sunni regime, rather than risk losing Syria entirely?
Abu Samak – yes you are right. I was being hurried and sloppy in relation to both Turkey and Hezbollah. To be more accurate, Hezbollah are inclined to support Assad because he’s supported them in the past. Great comments, thank you.